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Over a series of decisions between two or more probabilistically rewarded options, humans have 
a tendency to diversify their choices, even when this will lead to diminished overall reward. In the 
extreme case of probability matching, this tendency is expressed through allocation of choices 
in proportion to their likelihood of reward. Research suggests that this behaviour is an instinctive 
response, driven by heuristics, and that it may be overruled through the application of sufficient 
deliberation and self-control. However, if this is the case, then how and why did this response be-
come established? The present study explores the hypothesis that diversification of choices, and 
potentially probability matching, represents an overextension of a historically normative foraging 
strategy. This is done through examining choice behaviour on a simple simulated foraging task, de-
signed to model the natural process of accumulation of unharvested resources over time. Behav-
iour was then directly compared with that observed on a standard fixed probability task (cf. Ellerby 
& Tunney, 2017). Results indicated a convergence of choice patterns on the simulated foraging 
task, between participants who acted intuitively and those who took a more strategic approach. 
These findings are also compared with those of another similarly motivated study (Schulze, van 
Ravenzwaaij, & Newell, 2017). 
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INTRODUCTION
Consider a fair die with four red and two green sides. If it were to be 
rolled 100 times, the maximum expected number of correct predic-
tions would be 66.7, which can be achieved by exclusively predicting 
that it will land on red. However, given the task of maximising cor-
rect predictions, many respondents will instead tend to predict red on 
closer to two-thirds of rolls, although this will lead to an average of only 
55.6 correct predictions. This is an example of probability matching, a 
behavioural tendency towards the suboptimal diversification of choic-
es, which is often characterised by selecting options in approximate 
proportion to their outcome contingencies (cf. Vulkan, 2000; Shanks, 
Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002).
A recent study examined multiple putative factors in determining 
maximization versus diversification of choices (Ellerby & Tunney, 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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2017). Behaviour was assessed on a standard probability learning task, 
in which reward probabilities were fixed, independent and identically 
distributed (IID). In this case, investigation focused on the contribu-
tions of two key factors, identified a priori. First, heuristics, in that 
matching might represent an overwhelmingly intuitive response. 
Second, apophenia, in that matching might be driven by the misper-
ception of sequential dependencies in the reward sequence. These were 
not initially presumed to be mutually exclusive. In particular, it was 
considered that taking a more intuitive versus strategic approach might 
influence levels of apophenia, which could provide a vehicle for this ef-
fect. Results indicated that taking an intuitive versus strategic approach 
to the task is the predominant factor behind matching versus maxim-
ising behaviour. This is consistent with a heuristic-based account of 
probability matching, in which matching is the more readily available 
response (Koehler & James, 2010; Kogler & Kuehberger, 2007). In this 
case, probability matching is dominant when acting intuitively, but 
may be overruled upon the recognition and application of the max-
imising strategy through sufficient deliberation and subsequent cogni-
tive control. By contrast, although self-reported apophenia was both 
prevalent and found to be associated with taking an intuitive approach 
to the task, results indicated no link between apophenia and choices. 
No evidence was found in support of apophenia-based accounts of 
probability matching (cf. Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008; Unturbe & 
Corominas, 2007; Wolford, Newman, Miller, & Wig, 2004).
Therefore, if probability matching is truly a heuristic response, but 
this effect is not mediated by induced apophenia, then this raises the 
question of how and why this seemingly suboptimal behaviour came 
to be established. The present study was designed to explore one other 
possible answer to this question, which stems from fundamental dif-
ferences between the artificial decision tasks upon which matching has 
been generally observed and their more natural counterparts. 
Repeated choice between two options, each having fixed probabili-
ties of reward that are independent of their level of exploitation, is a 
situation that is rare in nature. It therefore seems unlikely that sufficient 
selection pressure will have been applied in order to behaviourally 
establish the optimal solution to this specific problem. To better ap-
proximate problems that were commonly faced over a sustained period 
of evolutionary ancestry, such as the optimal allocation of foraging 
time, certain additional factors must be taken into account. Examples 
include competition, generally with conspecifics, and the potential for 
unharvested resources to accumulate and deplete over time. The latter 
may often occur in a manner that is contingent upon levels of exploi-
tation, which can therefore provide a negative feedback mechanism. 
Crucially, accounting for these additional factors will radically alter 
what constitutes an optimal response pattern.
First, in a social environment, once a certain threshold of rivals is 
reached in competition for a more lucrative food source, taking advan-
tage of a lesser but unchallenged resource becomes the better option. 
Moreover, the optimal spread of competitors is in direct proportion to 
the value of each resource. While natural selection does not primar-
ily occur on the group level, the same principle is equally applicable 
at the individual level once it becomes prevalent in the population. 
In fact, diversification of choices will confer a progressively greater 
competitive advantage in an environment in which competitors act as 
overmatchers or, in the most extreme case, as maximizers. Therefore, 
in terms of competitive foraging behaviour, there is potentially both a 
pressure for probability matching to become the dominant tendency 
and a means for it to remain so, as an evolutionarily stable strategy (cf. 
Gallistel 1990; Gigerenzer, 1996; 2000; Skyrms, 1996; 1997). 
In behavioural ecology, the concept of the ideal free distribution, 
or IFD, (Fretwell & Lucas 1970, Fretwell 1972) has become unequivo-
cally well-established. Foraging behaviour in accordance with the IFD 
has been consistently documented across a wide range of species (cf. 
Ellerby & Tunney, 2017; Weber, 1998). The phenomenon of near op-
timal group-level matching behaviour, when under the influence of 
competition, has also been experimentally demonstrated in humans. 
The majority of studies in this area used a variety of modified simple 
zero-sum probabilistic choice tasks (Kraft & Baum, 2001; Kraft, Baum, 
& Burge, 2002; Madden, Peden, & Yamaguchi, 2002; Sokolowski, 
Tonneau, & Baque, 1999), while Goldstone and Ashpole (2004) applied 
a more complex and realistic simulated foraging environment. A more 
recent study has also highlighted individual-level matching behaviour 
as being socially adaptive under competition, finding that choices were 
sensitive to the strategy employed by simulated competitors (Schulze, 
van Ravenzwaaij, & Newell, 2015).
It is also noteworthy that, although behaviour has been broadly 
consistent with the IFD across all of these studies, another common 
finding has been some degree of undermatching. This has been evi-
dent in the behaviour of both humans and other animals. Intriguingly, 
one study reported substantial undermatching when rewards were 
probabilistically distributed, whereas dividing points evenly between 
participants that had selected an option resulted in a shift to near IFD 
matching (Kraft et al., 2002).
There are pertinent environmental factors to take into account even 
when considering an individual in isolation. One such consideration is 
that many natural resources can become depleted, or even completely 
exhausted by overexploitation. In this case, it is no longer optimal to 
exclusively take advantage of a single resource, even if it begins at a 
very high-value, but instead to spread foraging behaviours across vari-
ous options. The optimal allocation depends upon the rates of resource 
replenishment, but is, again, broadly proportional to each option’s rate 
of reward.
To demonstrate this point, consider the simplified example of two 
areas of forest, with one area being more fertile and just over twice as 
likely to produce an edible item (e.g., fruit, nuts, or mushroom) over 
any given time period. In this instance an average of seven versus three 
items are generated in each area per day. A forager is able to harvest 
food from only one of these two areas each day and aims to allocate 
their foraging time between the two areas in a manner that maximizes 
average long-term reward. The first day, it is of course best to search 
within the more productive area. The next day is the same, with the 
first area still likely to contain more food despite the expected number 
of food items within the less fertile area having compounded over the 
two days to six. On the third day, however, the sum of food expected to 
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have grown in the unharvested region has reached nine. This surpasses 
the expected daily generation amount of the more productive area. It 
is therefore optimal in this instance to forage within the less produc-
tive area. The next day, it becomes even more advantageous to search 
in the more productive area than ever before, as the expected items 
of food within this area will be fourteen, compared with only three 
within the less fertile region. Following this point, however, the same 
pattern emerges of the less fertile area being the better option to forage 
within once every three days. Moreover, it is easy to slightly increase 
the complexity of this simple model so as to simulate the satiety of the 
forager - through introducing a maximum limit of ten items of food 
that can be taken from each area per day. Once incorporating this fac-
tor, the outcome for optimal foraging between the two areas repeats at 
an exact 7:3 ratio, closely matching the rates of resource replenishment 
(see Table 1). 
Millions of generations of evolutionary ancestry have passed in 
which performance in natural foraging type situations would have 
been a prominent selection pressure. It seems likely that the tendency 
to diversify choices could have become established, through natural 
selection over this extended timescale, as what may be considered a 
default behaviour. By contrast, there has been a relatively negligible 
amount of time so far in which to adjust, at the genetic level, to the more 
rigid fixed probability schedules that have become more prevalent in 
modern day situations, such as those underlying common gambling 
tasks (e.g., dice, slot-machines, or online equivalents) and which form 
the basis of the standard two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) prob-
ability matching task. This provides a potentially compelling natural 
account of how probability matching might have become established, 
and remain to this day, as a prepotent intuitive response. 
One might expect that the behaviour of nonhuman animals 
could valuably inform this account. Although group-level matching 
of foraging time to rewards available in different areas has been well-
established in accordance with the IFD, examination of animal choice 
behaviour in social isolation, under closely controlled experimental 
conditions, has found somewhat equivocal results. Different behav-
iours have been found to predominate across the spectrum of match-
ing to maximizing, depending upon species and specific task condi-
tions (Behrend & Bitterman, 1961; Bullock & Bitterman, 1962; Graf, 
Bullock & Bitterman, 1964; Longo, 1964; Meyer, 1960; Wilson, Oscar 
& Bitterman, 1964). Although diversification of choices has often 
been observed, probability maximizing can be learned on concurrent 
variable-ratio schedules, in accordance with the generalized matching 
law (cf. Herrnstein, 1961; Herrnstein & Loveland, 1975; Davison & 
McCarthy, 1988; Poling, Edwards, Weeden & Foster, 2011), which nev-
ertheless predicts probability matching on variable-interval schedules.
Although it is important to consider that some animal species have 
been found to approach probability maximizing under certain task 
conditions, we also propose that this behaviour does not necessarily 
preclude matching from being the initial instinctive response. It is pos-
sible that humans and other animals hold in common the tendency to 
instinctively match choices to reward contingencies, whether or not 
this may be overruled in certain cases by other processes. These include 
reinforcement learning and also, at least in humans, deliberative self-
control. Moreover, although we expect that top-down executive control 
is generally applied to overrule the instinctive response according to 
reasoned understanding of the benefits of probability maximizing, it is 
also possible that such top-down control might sometimes be exerted 
with the opposite effect, instead incorrectly reinforcing the matching 
response as a result of mistaken heuristic- or apophenia- driven beliefs.
Overview of the Experiment
While a body of existing literature has addressed whether human 
choice behaviour falls in line with the IFD under the influence of com-
petition, at the time that the present study was conducted (2016), we 
were aware of none that had reported on equivalent behavioural com-
parisons for a purely individual situation, in which the adaptive benefit 
of choice diversification derives instead from the prospect of resource 
accumulation. Sugrue, Corrado and Newsome (2004) did include such 
an assessment of choice behaviour in Rhesus monkeys. In their study, 
choice proportions were found to match the ratio of rewards on a dy-
namic foraging task, in which choices were made between two options 
with independent and stochastic rates of reward assignment, but where 
assigned rewards would persist over time until the option was chosen. 
Since the time of conducting the present experiment, another study 
has been published with very similar theoretical motivation (Schulze, 
Trial number Expected items: Area 1
Expected 
items: Area 2
Choice 
(assumes 
optimal)
1 3 7 Area 2
2 6 7 Area 2
3 9 7 Area 1
4 3 14 Area 2
5 6 11 Area 2
6 9 8 Area 1
7 3 15 Area 2
8 6 12 Area 2
9 9 9 Area 1
10 3 16 Area 2
11 6 13 Area 2
12 9 10 Area 2
13 12 7 Area 1
14 5 14 Area 2
15 8 11 Area 2
16 11 8 Area 1
17 4 15 Area 2
18 7 12 Area 2
19 10 9 Area 1
20 (repeat 10) 3 16 Area 2
21 (repeat 11) 6 13 Area 2
TABLE 1.  
Illustration of an Optimal Foraging Sequence, in a Simplified 
Two Area Model with Resource Generation Rates of Seven 
Versus Three and Satiety Limit of Ten Items Per Day
Note. This sequence is distinct from, though broadly analogous to, the probabil-
istic reward generation schedule applied in the simple simulated foraging task.
ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGYRESEARCH ARTICLE
http://www.ac-psych.org2019 • volume 15(2) • 111-126114
van Ravenzwaaij & Newell, 2017). Here, the authors acknowledge that 
reward-persistence in an unchosen option will make diversification an 
effective choice strategy, then proceed to investigate the effects of per-
sistent, or lingering, rewards on participants’ actual patterns of choice 
behaviour.
The present study was originally designed to test whether the prin-
ciples observed by Sugrue et al. (2004) extend to human behaviour. To 
do so, choice behaviour was examined on a simple simulated forag-
ing task (SSFT). This task modifies the standard probability matching 
preparation to incorporate the stochastic accumulation and choice-
driven depletion of resources over time into the underlying reward 
schedule. Task instructions and choice stimuli were also changed to 
superficially denote a foraging situation, although this still represents 
a simple 2AFC task. Further, choices were not examined exclusively 
on the SSFT. Behaviour on this task was also compared and contrasted 
with behaviour on the standard probability matching preparation, as 
reported in Ellerby and Tunney (2017). These two tasks were also com-
pared for the effects of manipulating reward probability information 
and of self-reported intuition versus strategy use.
It will be informative to compare observed behaviour on this SSFT 
with the results obtained by Schulze et al. (2017), who compared hu-
man choices in a reward-hold condition, in which an unharvested re-
ward would persist until collected, with a no hold condition. Although 
this manipulation is comparable with the accumulation of unharvested 
resources that is modelled in the SSFT, there are key differences be-
tween each of these conditions and their counterparts in the present 
study. In the reward-hold condition, only a single reward could persist 
at each option at any given time, irrespective of how long this option 
remained unexploited. By contrast, on the SSFT, resource accrual is 
permitted to continue indefinitely, in line with each option’s respec-
tive resource generation probability. This means that there can be 
more than one reward held in the bank at an option that has not been 
chosen for multiple trials, although only a single reward can be taken 
on any given trial. In addition, in the no hold condition, Schulze et al. 
manipulated the fixed reward contingencies in order to match the dis-
criminability between the two response options to that experienced by 
participants in the reward hold condition. As the present study draws 
its comparison against fixed-probability choices obtained from a pre-
existing data-set, this procedure was omitted. Instead, an additional 
analysis was conducted to assess the relationship between the level of 
discriminability in outcome contingencies of the two options, as expe-
rienced by each respondent, and their subsequent choices.
It was hypothesised that responses on the SSFT would show a sub-
stantial degree of choice diversification, tending towards probability 
matching and potentially some degree of undermatching relative to 
the actual ratio of resource generation rates. It was also predicted that 
choices on the foraging task would show a relative absence of effects of 
either stated versus learned reward probabilities, or of intuition versus 
strategy use. When considering the SSFT together with the standard 
fixed probability task, the former of these should manifest as a signifi-
cant interaction effect between task and probability condition.
METHOD
Participants
Sixty participants completed the SSFT. These were recruited in an op-
portunity sample, drawn primarily from the student population at the 
University of Nottingham. Of these, 17 were male and 43 female. Ages 
ranged from 17 to 44 (M = 24.03, SD = 4.74). This sample size was 
designed to match that of a fixed-probability task condition reported 
in a preceding study (cf. Ellerby & Tunney, 2017). In the standard 
task group (data taken from the aforementioned study), there were a 
further 60 participants, recruited in the same manner in a previous 
experimental session. In this group, 16 participants were male and 44 
female, with an age range of 18 to 33 (M = 22.62, SD = 3.09).
Participants were paid an inconvenience allowance with a value 
contingent upon the choices they made during the task. Both optimal 
exploitation of resources on the SSFT and probability maximizing on 
the standard task would accumulate average total winnings of £5.88.
Experimental Design
This experiment took a 2 × 42 mixed model design, with probability 
condition (stated vs. learned) as a between-subjects factor and block 
(1 to 42) as a within-subject factor. In the stated probability condition, 
participants were informed that the two patches of land would generate 
resources probabilistically, at the different rates of 0.49 versus 0.21 and 
that resources would be allowed to accumulate over time, but that only 
a single reward could be taken on any one trial (see Appendix B). In 
the learned probability condition, participants were not provided with 
any information about reward accumulation rates. Which of the two 
choices had the higher rate of resource accumulation was counterbal-
anced between participants, in order to account for any bias in favour 
of a particular colour. All participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the two experimental conditions.
These data were also contrasted with equivalent data obtained from 
participants that completed a standard fixed probability task, in a 2 × 
2 × 42 design, with task as an additional between-subjects factor. This 
comparison group comprised participants who completed the stand-
ard task condition of the preceding study (Ellerby & Tunney, 2017).
Stimuli
A plain white background was maintained throughout the task. A 
black central fixation cross was used between trials. Stimuli consisted 
of images of two identical patches of woodland, with a blue and a yel-
low signpost to distinguish between them (see Figure 1). These were 
positioned equidistant from the centre and the left or right edge of the 
screen, with the side of presentation varying randomly between trials. 
The experimental procedure was designed and coded within Psychopy 
(Peirce, 2007).
Task Procedure
For comparison purposes, the procedure was based closely upon that 
used in the preceding study (Ellerby & Tunney, 2017). The task was an 
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iterated 2AFC in which participants made repeated decisions between 
the two patches of land over 420 trials with the aim of maximizing total 
pay-offs over the entire task. There was no initial training period. Task 
instructions provided to participants are shown in Appendices A and 
B. Each trial began with a black central fixation cross upon a white 
background. The duration of the fixation varied randomly between 
one and two seconds. This was followed by the appearance of the 
two patches of land, to the left and right of the computer screen. The 
right-left position of the two patches of land varied randomly between 
trials and was not predictive of reward. Participants were explicitly 
told in the instructions to make their choices on the basis of identity 
(colour of the signpost) rather than the position of the patch of land 
(see Appendix A). Upon presentation of the stimuli, participants were 
free to make their predictions by pressing the q or p keys on a standard 
QWERTY keyboard to indicate the stimulus to the left or right side of 
the screen, respectively. Shortly after each prediction (500 ms) a green 
tick or red cross was overlaid on the image of the patch of land that had 
been chosen (see Figure 2). This graphic was accompanied by either 
the word WIN or LOSE shown to the centre of the screen. Participants 
received a £0.02 reward for each correct prediction.
Simple Simulated Foraging Task 
Reward Schedule
The probabilities of a new resource appearing in each patch were fixed 
throughout the task, at 0.49 and 0.21 for the high and low accumula-
tion rate options, respectively. However, uncollected rewards were al-
lowed to both accumulate and persist over time, indefinitely over the 
entire task. This meant that actual reward contingencies varied over 
time in a manner that depended upon participants’ previous choices. 
An illustration of the effects of this process of reward accumulation 
on the actual reward contingencies of each option, depending upon 
the number of trials since last observed to be exhausted, is shown in 
Table 2. Notably, although multiple rewards could accrue over time, 
only a single reward could be obtained on any one trial, leaving any 
remaining resources available for future exploitation. This stipulation 
was designed to mimic the effects of satiety in a natural environment. 
It also guaranteed two important principles. First, that the reward 
obtained on any given trial was always of equal magnitude. Second, 
that a substantial degree of diversification was necessary to fully exploit 
resources over the task. In practice, this precludes the potential strat-
egy of allowing resources to extensively accrue within one unselected 
option, and then collecting all unharvested rewards through single 
sporadic selections of this underexploited area.
Nevertheless, a range of possible choice diversification ratios al-
lowed an approximately optimal exploitation of resources on the SSFT. 
When considering the selection of the option with the highest likeli-
hood of reward on each individual trial, choices repeat at a 2:1 ratio 
of high to low resource generation rate options. However, exploration 
ratios of either 3:1 or 1:1 could also keep expected resources in each op-
tion from exceeding one, and therefore prevent a wasteful ”runaway” 
accumulation of unharvested resources in either option. We also con-
ducted calculations to estimate the proportions of high and low gen-
eration rate choices necessary to bring back runaway accumulated re-
sources to normal levels, given extreme initial choice conditions. First, 
in the case of 100 initial choices of the high generation rate option, 
we calculated that an average of 69.28 subsequent choices would be 
necessary to bring available resources in each option back to baseline, 
with a ratio of .79 high generation rate choices over the entire sequence 
(inclusive of the initial 100 trials). Following 100 initial choices of the 
low generation rate choices, we calculated that an average of 162.21 
subsequent choices would be required, with a ratio of .49 high genera-
tion rate choices over the entire sequence.
The accumulation rates of both patches were determined with the 
primary aims of remaining proportional to the reward probabilities 
used in the fixed probability tasks reported in Ellerby and Tunney 
(2017), while also summing to 0.7. This means that an optimal strategy 
could expect to obtain a reward on an average of 70% of trials, main-
taining maximum pay-offs on the SSFT as equivalent to those on the 
FIGURE 1.
Example choice stimuli for the simple simulated foraging task.
FIGURE 2.
Example feedback stimuli for the simple simulated foraging task. Panel A shows an unsuccessful forage attempt. Panel B shows a 
successful forage attempt.
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standard fixed-probability task. We considered this to be an important 
prerequisite for the purposes of directly comparing behaviour across 
the two tasks, as previous studies have found that increased financial 
incentives lead to a reduction in choice diversification (Brackbill, 
Starr, & Kappy, 1962; Shanks et al., 2002; Siegel & Goldstein, 1959). 
Participants in the stated probability condition were fully informed 
of this reward schedule before beginning the task, while those in the 
learned probability condition began completely naïve to it. Neither 
group received any external indicator of the amount of reward cur-
rently held in each option. Rather, they were required to estimate this 
in their own capacity, using the knowledge they had learned about the 
underlying reward schedules.
Questionnaire
At the end of the experiment, participants completed a questionnaire, 
based on that used in Ellerby and Tunney (2017). Participants were 
asked to estimate the proportion of trials in which a new resource had 
appeared in each colour patch (0% to 100%), the extent to which they 
relied upon intuition or strategy in making their predictions (1 to 5), 
and the extent to which they believed there to have been a predictable 
pattern in the reward sequence (1 to 5).
RESULTS
The proportions of selection of the high resource generation rate option 
for each 10-trial block are shown are shown in Figure 3, for each task 
and probability condition. Distributions of individual proportions of 
high generation rate choices are shown in Figure 4, Panels B, D, and F. 
The data for the SSFT were entered into a 2 × 42 mixed model analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) with probability condition (stated vs. learned) as 
a between-subjects factor and block (1 to 42) as a within-subject factor. 
This found no significant main effect of block, F(16.64, 965.38) = 1.09, 
MSe = .08, p = .36, ηp2 = .02,1 and no significant linear effect of block, 
F(1, 58) < 1.0, indicating that participants did not significantly increase 
their proportions of selections of the maximizing alternative as the experi-
ment progressed. There was also no main effect of probability condition, 
F(1, 58) = 3.09, MSe  = .17, p = .08, ηp2 = .05, suggesting that participants 
who had been explicitly informed of the probabilistic accumulation rates 
did not allocate significantly more or fewer responses to the patch with the 
higher accumulation rate than those who had to learn these from experi-
ence alone. There was neither a significant interaction, F(16.64, 965.38) 
< 1.0,1 nor a linear interaction, F(1, 58) < 1.0, between block and prob-
ability condition.
Averaging steady state proportions of high accumulation rate 
choices on the SSFT over the final third of the task revealed values of 
.66 for the stated probabilities condition and .63 for learned probabili-
ties condition with 95% CIs of .02 and .04, respectively (see Table 3). 
These indicate that there was no significant difference between the two 
groups, but average behaviour within each group significantly under-
matched the actual ratio of reward generation probabilities (.7). Note, 
Trials since 
exhaustion
Probability of one or 
more reward Total expected reward
GR = .21 GR = .49 GR = .21 GR = .49
1 .210 .490 0.21 0.49
2 .376 .740 0.42 0.98
3 .507 .867 0.63 1.47
4 .610 .932 0.84 1.96
5 .692 .965 1.05 2.45
6 .757 .982 1.26 2.94
7 .808 .991 1.47 3.43
8 .848 .995 1.68 3.92
9 .880 .998 1.89 4.41
10 .905 .999 2.10 4.90
TABLE 2.  
Probability of Reward Presence and Overall Expected Reward at 
Each of the Two Options, Depending Upon Resource Generation 
Rate and Number of Trials Since Last Known to be Exhausted
Note. GR = resource generation rate.
FIGURE 3.
Proportions of selection of the high probability and high resource generation rate options. Shown for each block, probability, and 
task condition.
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FIGURE 4.
Histograms showing the number of participants who made different proportions of maximizing and high generation rate choices. 
Panels A and B show responses for only the first 10-trial block, Panels C and D - over the entire task, and Panels E and F - for the final 
third of the task. Panels A, C, and E show the standard condition and Panels B, D, and F - the SSFT condition.
however, that choices did not significantly undermatch the ratio of a 
locally optimal choice diversification strategy (2:1).
Subjective Estimates of Resource 
Generation Rates
Subjective estimates of the relative resource generation rates of the 
two options were calculated by determining the proportion of total 
Task
Standard SSFT
M SE M SE
Stated .944 .021 .659 .011
Learned .805 .032 .631 .019
TABLE 3.  
Steady State Proportions of Maximizing and High Resource 
Generation Rate Choices for the Standard Task and the Simple 
Simulated Foraging Task, Respectively.
Note. SSFT = simple simulated foraging task.
estimated generation rate accounted for by the high accumulation rate 
option (grHest / [grHest + grLest]). Group averages are shown in Table 
4. Average reward probability estimates from the standard condition 
of the preceding study are also shown for comparison purposes. Of 
participants who completed the SSFT, an independent samples t-test 
revealed no significant difference between the relative estimated accu-
mulation rates of those within the learned and stated probability condi-
tions, t(58) = .32, p = .75. These estimates also did not significantly 
differ within any condition from the actual ratio of resource generation 
rates.
We also assessed the association between perceived ratio of SSFT 
resource generation rates and overall proportions of high generation 
rate choices. This revealed no significant overall effect, r = .16, p = .22, 
n = 60, neither within the stated probability, r = -.05, p = .79, n = 30, nor 
learned probability conditions, r = .29, p = .13, n = 30).
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Heuristics and Apophenia
Self-reported use of strategy and belief that the outcome sequences 
contained patterns are shown in Tables 5 and 6. On the SSFT, these 
also did not differ between probability conditions, t(58) = .90, p = .37, 
t(58) = -.92, p = .36.
Experienced Discriminability
When reward contingencies are fixed, so is outcome discriminabil-
ity – this being the difference in experienced proportion of rewarded 
trials for each option. However, on the SSFT, experienced outcome 
discriminability depends upon choices, and therefore varies between 
participants. Here, we conducted an additional analysis to assess the 
potential effect of experienced outcome discriminability on choices. 
In order to avoid direct dependence of discriminability on choices, 
we correlated the level of outcome discriminability experienced over 
the initial 280 trials of the SSFT against proportions of high generation 
rate choices over the subsequent 140 trials. This revealed a significant 
overall negative association, r = −.42, p < .001, n = 60). This effect 
was found to be stronger in the learned probability, r = −.66, p < .001, 
n = 30, than the stated probability condition, where it was nonsignifi-
cant, r = −.25, p = .19, n = 30). 
We also examined the effect of experienced outcome discrimina-
bility over the entire task on participants’ estimated ratio of reward 
generation rates. This identified no relationship overall, r = .00, p = .98, 
n = 60, neither within the stated probability, r = .11, p = .58, n = 30 nor 
learned probability conditions, r = −.06, p = .74, n = 30.
Comparisons With a Standard 
Probability Matching Task
We also compared the data from the SSFT directly with correspond-
ing behavioural data collected on a standard fixed-probability task. 
These data were obtained in the preceding study (Ellerby & Tunney, 
2017). There are two principal differences between the SSFT and the 
standard task. The first of these is superficial. The SSFT was explicitly 
described as a foraging task, with choices made between two patches 
of land, whereas the standard task was framed as a probability task, 
with predictions made between which of two light bulbs would switch 
on. The second, more substantive difference is between the underlying 
reward schedules. On the SSFT, unharvested rewards remained and 
accumulated over time, while on the standard task they did not—re-
ward contingencies were instead both fixed and IID. Otherwise, the 
two tasks were equivalent. Both were iterated two-alternative forced-
choices, with the aim of maximizing total reward over a total of 420 
trials. All stimulus durations, intertrial and interstimulus intervals also 
remained the same. 
Selection proportions of the higher probability option on the stand-
ard fixed probability task are shown in Figure 3, alongside the selection 
proportions of the higher resource generation rate option on the SSFT. 
Distributions of individual proportions of maximizing choices are 
shown in Figure 4, Panels A, C, and E. These data were entered into 
2 × 2 × 42 mixed model ANOVA with both probability condition 
(stated vs. learned) and task (standard vs. SSFT) as between-subjects 
factors and with block (1 to 42) as a within-subject factor. This re-
vealed both a significant main effect of block, F(20.54, 2382.53) = 3.81, 
MSe  = .05, p < .001, ηp2 = .03,1 and a significant linear effect of block, 
F(1, 116) = 30.16, MSe  = .09, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, indicating that par-
ticipants overall learned to allocate a significantly higher proportion of 
choices to the higher probability options (of either reward or resource 
accumulation) as the experiment progressed. There were also sig-
nificant main effects of both probability condition, F(1, 116) = 35.66, 
MSe  = .35, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, and task, F(1, 116) = 131.22, MSe = .35, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .53. These indicate that, overall, participants who had 
received explicit information regarding the probability rates chose the 
high probability option more often than those who had to learn this 
information for themselves, and that participants in the standard task 
group allocated significantly more choices to the maximizing option 
than participants in the SSFT group allocated to the high accumulation 
rate option. 
This analysis also revealed theoretically informative interaction ef-
fects. First, there was a significant interaction between block and task, 
F(20.54, 2382.53) = 3.36, MSe = .05, p < .001, ηp2 = .031, as well as a 
significant linear interaction, F(1, 116) = 20.96, MSe = .09, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .15, representing significantly greater learning on the standard 
task than the SSFT. Second, there was also a significant interaction 
between probability condition and task, F(1, 116) = 18.04, MSe = .35, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .14, with the effect of stated reward probabilities on par-
ticipants’ choices being significantly greater on the standard than the 
foraging task. When viewing these interaction effects in conjunction 
with the findings of the preceding analysis, conducted upon behaviour 
solely within the SSFT group, it is evident that the main effects of both 
block and probability condition were driven by differences within the 
standard condition. There was neither a significant interaction between 
block and probability condition, F(20.54, 2382.53) = 1.21, MSe = .05, 
p = .23, ηp2 = .01,1 nor a linear interaction, F(1, 116) = 2.80, MSe = .09, 
p = .10, ηp2 = .02. There was also neither a three-way interaction, 
F(20.54, 2382.53) < 1.0,1 nor a reliable three-way linear interaction, 
F(1, 116) = 2.77, MSe = .09, p = .10, ηp2 = .02. 
Subjective Estimates of Reward 
Probabilities
Subjective estimates of outcome probabilities and relative resource ac-
cumulation rates are shown in Table 4. A 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted 
with probability condition (stated vs. learned) and task (standard vs. 
SSFT) as between-subjects factors. There was neither a significant 
effect of probability condition, F(1, 116) = 1.34, MSe = .01, p = .25, 
Task
Standard SSFT
M SE M SE
Stated .685 .010 .680 .012
Learned .727 .020 .674 .017
TABLE 4.  
Subjective Estimates of Outcome Probabilities and Relative 
Resource Generation Rates, by Probability Condition and Task.
Note. SSFT = simple simulated foraging task.
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Mediation Analysis
Independent mediation analyses were conducted within both the 
standard and SSFT conditions, using the PROCESS macro for SPSS 
(Hayes, 2012, 2013). The primary purpose of these analyses was to 
compare and contrast the relative effects of the probability condition 
manipulations between the two tasks, and, in particular, self-reported 
intuition versus strategy use and apophenia on choice behaviour. For 
this analysis, proportions of maximizing choices were calculated for 
the final third of the tasks. This was done with the aim of accounting 
for learning effects within the standard condition and within the SSFT 
group for consistency, despite no evidence of significant learning on 
this task. Mediation Model 6 was used in order to maintain consistency 
with the preceding study (Ellerby & Tunney, 2017). This model includ-
ed a single independent variable and two mediator variables, of which 
the former (intuition vs. strategy) was allowed to influence the latter 
(pattern belief). This model reflects the conception of intuition versus 
strategy as a more general approach which may be taken from the be-
ginning of the task, whereas apophenia depends upon experience, and 
so might be influenced by whether a more or less strategic approach 
was taken. Effects were calculated for each of 10,000 bootstrapped 
samples. Model results are presented in Figures 5 and 6 (Variable 
coding is as follows: Stated = 0 Learned = 1, Intuition–Strategy = 1–5, 
Pattern belief = 1–5, Proportion of maximizing choices = 0–1). 
For participants who completed the standard task, the direct 
effect of probability condition on strategy use was found to be sig-
nificant, t(58) = −2.33, p = .02, with this predictor accounting for 
9% of the sample variance (R2= .09). The direct effect of probability 
condition on apophenia was found to be nonsignificant, t(57) = 1.17, 
p = .25, while the direct effect of strategy use on apophenia was sig-
nificant, t(57) = −2.57, p = .01, with these two predictors accounting 
for 16% of the sample variance (R2= .16). The direct effects of prob-
ability condition, t(56) = −3.05, p = .004, and strategy use, t(56) = 
3.37, p = .001, on proportion of maximizing choices were each found 
to be significant, whereas the direct the effect of apophenia was not, 
t(56) =  −.90, p = .37. These three predictors accounted for 39% of the 
sample variance (R2 = .39).
The unstandardized indirect effects of probability condition on the 
proportion of maximizing choices were as follows: Through intuition 
versus strategy use, (−.600)(.056) = −.034, 95% CIs [−.074, −.008], 
significant at α = .05. Through apophenia, (.385)(−.012) = −.005, 95% 
CIs [−.034, .005], nonsignificant at α =.05. Through first strategy use 
then apophenia, (−.600)(−.413)(−.012) = −.003, 95% CIs [−.019, .003], 
nonsignificant at α = .05.
For participants who completed the SSFT, all effects were found to 
be nonsignificant. The direct effect of probability condition on strategy 
use, t(58) = −.23, p = .37, accounted for 1% of the sample variance (R2 
= .01). The direct effects of probability condition, t(57) = 1.13, p = .26, 
and strategy use, t(57) = 1.70, p = .10, on apophenia together accounted 
for 6% of the sample variance (R2= .06). The direct effects of probability 
condition, t(56) = −1.30, p = .20, strategy use, t(56) = .98, p = .33, and 
apophenia, t(56) = 1.15, p = .26, on proportions of high accumulation 
rate choices together accounted for 8% of the sample variance (R2 =  .08).
ηp2= .01, nor task, F(1, 116) = 3.69, MSe = .01, p = .06, ηp2 = .03, nor 
a reliable interaction between the two, F(1, 116) = 2.54, MSe = .01, 
p = .11, ηp2 = .02. 
A significant positive association between estimated reward con-
tingencies and maximizing choices was found within the learned prob-
ability condition of the standard task, r = .52, p < .01, n = 30. However, 
no significant effect was evident either within the stated probability 
condition, r = −.17, p = .37, n = 30, or overall, r = .14, p = .30, n = 60).
Heuristics
Self-reported use of strategy vs intuition (see Table 5) was en-
tered into a 2 × 2 ANOVA with probability condition and task as 
between-subjects factors. A main effect of probability condition, 
F(1, 116) = 5.19, MSe = 1.00, p = .03, ηp2 = .04, showed that participants 
in the stated probability condition reported greater strategy use than 
those in the learned probability condition. There was no effect of task, 
F(1, 116) < 1.0, and no significant interaction between the two, 
F(1, 116) = 1.01, MSe = 1.00, p = .32, ηp2 = .01.
Bartlett’s test indicated no evidence for either heterogeneity of vari-
ance or departure from normality in reported strategy use between the 
two tasks, χ2(1) = .04, p = .84. 
Apophenia
Self-reported beliefs that the outcome sequences contained a pattern 
(see Table 6) were entered into another 2 × 2 ANOVA. This revealed 
a significant main effect of probability condition, F(1, 116) = 4.20, 
MSe = 1.45, p = .04, ηp2 = .04, indicating that participants in the learned 
probability condition reported significantly higher levels of apophenia 
than those in the stated probability condition. A main effect of task, F(1, 
116) = 18.74, MSe  = 1.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, was also found, indicating 
that participants that had completed the SSFT reported significantly 
higher levels of belief that there was a pattern in the sequence than 
those who had completed the standard task. There was no interaction 
between the two factors, F(1, 116) < 1.0. 
Task
Standard SSFT
M SE M SE
Stated 3.800 0.176 3.467 0.205
Learned 3.200 0.188 3.233 0.157
TABLE 5.  
Subjective Reports of Strategy Use by Condition and Task.
Note. Scores ranged from 1 = pure intuition to 5 = pure strategy. SSFT = simple 
simulated foraging task.
Task
Standard SSFT
M SE M SE
Stated 2.000 0.209 3.133 0.227
Learned 2.633 0.256 3.400 0.177
TABLE 6.  
Subjective Reports of Belief That Outcome Sequences Contained 
a Pattern, by Condition and Task
Note. Scores ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. SSFT = 
simple simulated foraging task.
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The unstandardized indirect effects of probability condition on the 
proportion of high accumulation rate choices were as follows: Through 
intuition versus strategy use, (−.233)(.011) = −.003, 95% CIs [−.025, 
.025]. Through apophenia, (.324)(.012) = .004, 95% CIs [−.002, .023]. 
Through first strategy use then apophenia, (−.233)(.244)(.012) = −.001, 
95% CIs [−.009, .0003]. All indirect effects were also nonsignificant at 
α = .05.
Win-Stay Lose-Shift
The proportion of choices that were consistent with a win-stay lose-
shift (WSLS) strategy was also assessed for participants both within the 
SSFT and the standard task conditions (see Table 7). 
Overall proportions of WSLS-consistent choices were entered into 
a 2 × 2 ANOVA, with probability condition (stated vs. learned) and 
task (standard vs. SSFT) as between-subjects factors. This found nei-
ther a main effect of probability condition, F(1, 116)  < 1.0, nor of task, 
F(1, 116) = 1.42, MSe = .01, p = .24, ηp2 = .01. However, a significant 
two-way interaction was found, F(1, 116) = 6.20, MSe = .01, p = .01, 
ηp2= .05. This reflects the finding that, on the SSFT, those in the learned 
resource generation rate condition made more WSLS-consistent 
choices than those in the stated condition, whereas on the standard 
task, the opposite was true. 
There is an important caveat when interpreting these comparisons. 
Expected baseline proportions of WSLS-consistent choices will differ 
between tasks, whether or not WSLS was actively pursued as a strat-
egy. Similarly, the expected proportion of WSLS-consistent choices 
within the standard task will systematically increase in line with the 
proportion of maximizing choices. Here, for example, maximizing will 
entail a proportion of .7 WSLS-consistent choices (all being win-stay) 
and WSLS-independent matching—only .58. On a fixed-probability 
task, it is therefore possible to control for between-subjects variance 
in expected WSLS choices derived from each participants’ proportion 
of maximizing choices (cf. Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008; Ellerby & 
Tunney, 2017). However, calculating equivalent values according to 
overall choice proportions is not feasible for the SSFT due to depend-
encies between trials. That is, equal proportions of high generation rate 
choices may lead to differing proportions of WSLS-consistent choices, 
depending upon the sequence in which they were made. In light of this, 
we chose to compare uncorrected proportions of WSLS-consistent 
choices from both tasks.
The interaction effect observed here is likely partially explained 
by the aforementioned mechanism; lower proportions of WSLS-
consistent choices on the learned probability condition of the standard 
task corresponded with significantly lower proportions of maximizing 
choices observed in the same condition. However, the inverse effect 
found between the SSFT conditions cannot be similarly explained. This 
might instead reflect a greater number of participants in the learned 
probability SSFT condition adopting a genuine WSLS-driven approach 
to their choices.
Further insight into choice behaviour could be afforded by inves-
tigating the proportions of win-shift and lose-shift choices indepen-
dently. Here, we report how often participants were found to switch to 
the alternative option following a win or a loss on the preceding trial 
(see Tables 9 and 10). Expected baseline amounts of win- and lose-shift 
choices were also calculated for different choice strategies from each 
of the two tasks. These are shown in Table 8 for comparison purposes. 
Win-shift choices as a proportion of all choices following a 
win, were entered into a 2 × 2 ANOVA, with probability condition 
(stated vs. learned) and task (standard vs. SSFT) as between-subjects 
factors. This revealed no main effect of probability condition, 
F(1, 116) < 1.0. However, a significant main effect of task was found, 
F(1, 116) = 47.39, MSe = .02, p < .001, ηp2 = .29, representing significant-
ly higher proportions of win-shift choices on the SSFT as compared to 
the standard task. A significant two-way interaction was also found, 
F(1, 116) = 19.42, MSe = .02, p < .001,  ηp2 = 14, reflecting the finding 
that participants on the standard task were more likely to shift follow-
ing a win in the learned probability condition, whereas participants on 
the SSFT were more likely to do so in the stated probability condition.
Lose-shift choices as a proportion of all choices following a loss, 
were also entered into a 2 × 2 ANOVA, with probability condition 
(stated vs. learned) and task (standard vs. SSFT) as between-subjects 
factors. This revealed significant main effects of both probability con-
FIGURE 5.
Mediation model for the standard task condition. Unstandard-
ized regression coefficients are shown with an asterisk if signifi-
cant. Solid and dotted lines indicate significant and nonsignifi-
cant effects, respectively. α = .05.
FIGURE 6.
Mediation model for the simple simulated foraging task condi-
tion. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown with an 
asterisk if significant. Solid and dotted lines indicate significant 
and nonsignificant effects, respectively. α = .05.
Task
Standard SSFT
M SE M SE
Stated .694 .011 .627 .022
Learned .661 .017 .685 .023
TABLE 7.  
Proportions of Win-Stay Lose-Shift--Consistent Choices, Shown for 
Each Task and Probability Condition
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dition, F(1, 116) = 13.70, MSe = .03, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, and of task, 
F(1, 116) = 93.08, MSe = .03, p < .001, ηp2 = .45. These represent sig-
nificantly higher proportions of lose-shift choices both when prob-
abilities were learned instead of stated and on the SSFT relative to the 
standard task. A significant two-way interaction was also found, F(1, 
116) = 15.63, MSe = .03, p < .001, ηp2 = 12. This reflects the finding that 
participants on the standard task were substantially more likely to shift 
following a loss in the learned probability than in the stated probabil-
ity condition, whereas participants on the SSFT were approximately 
equally likely to switch following a loss in each probability condition.
DISCUSSION
Following millions of years of natural selection, it can be expected that the 
most highly adaptive rules should have emerged as instinctive, or default, 
behavioural responses. While heuristic accounts provide a superficial ex-
planation of nonnormative choice diversification, they do not address the 
question of precisely how such a seemingly suboptimal tendency as prob-
ability matching could have become established and remain to this day 
as a dominant intuitive strategy. The current study was motivated by this 
question. One intriguing proposal is that choice diversification, including 
the case of probability matching, might reflect the expression of a gener-
ally optimal decision criterion for the purposes of time allocation in forag-
ing situations, which has become established over an extended period of 
evolutionary ancestry. In humans, this rule is therefore expressed predom-
inantly when the actor behaves in accordance with their intuitions. Under 
this interpretation, humans do, in fact, have what has been generally the 
most adaptive response pattern readily and naturally available. This leads 
to the dominance of this choice strategy when alternatives lack availability, 
as discussed by Koehler and James (2010). Therefore, the expression of 
probability matching behaviour when confronted with the standard 2AFC 
task in which reward contingencies are fixed and IID, might represent an 
overextension of what has been an otherwise normative behaviour. 
This study investigated human behaviour on a simple simulated forag-
ing task (SSFT), which was designed to incorporate the factor of resource 
accumulation over time into the standard 2AFC probability matching 
preparation. Behaviour on this task was then compared with that on the 
standard version, obtained in a preceding study (Ellerby & Tunney, 2017). 
Differences were also examined in how a number of other factors relate 
to choice behaviour and each other across the two tasks. When viewing 
behaviour on the SSFT alone, no significant learning effect was found, 
coupled with no effect of explicitly stating the reward accumulation rates. 
For participants who completed the SSFT, stating reward contingencies 
also had no effect on either subjective estimates of accumulation rates, the 
use of strategy over intuition, or levels of apophenia. A tendency towards 
group-level undermatching was evident in relation to the ratio of resource 
generation rates, though not in relation to a locally optimal 2:1 ratio of 
choice allocations across the task. 
Direct comparison of these results with those on a standard, fixed-
probability task revealed a stark contrast between effects. Simple main ef-
fects indicated substantially lower proportions of high resource generation 
rate choices on the SSFT than proportions of maximizing choices on the 
standard fixed probabilities task. Moreover, significant interactions were 
found involving task and both learning and the effects of stated reward 
probabilities. These findings represent robust effects of each of these fac-
tors within the standard condition, paired with their absence on the SSFT. 
Furthermore, a mediation analysis revealed that the significant effect of in-
tuition versus strategy use on choice behaviour, which was present on the 
standard task, disappeared on the SSFT. This was true despite no evidence 
being found for either a significant difference in overall levels of strategy 
use or for heterogeneity of variance in levels of strategy use between the 
two tasks. In line with these findings, the indirect effect of stating reward 
probabilities on choices through facilitation of strategy use was also absent 
on the SSFT. 
This evidence indicates that while on the standard task, participants 
behave differently depending upon whether they adopt a predominantly 
intuitive or strategic approach, on the SSFT, the degree to which a more 
deliberative strategy is applied no longer has any substantive influence on 
choice behaviour. This finding is consistent with heuristic-based accounts 
which propose that probability matching is prepotent when participants 
act intuitively. As choice diversification, including probability matching, 
can represent an optimal choice strategy on tasks in which unharvested 
rewards can persist and accumulate, participants acting either intuitively 
or strategically can converge upon equivalent response proportions when 
completing the SSFT. By contrast, on the standard task in which prob-
Shift after 
win
Shift after 
loss
Probability maximizing (standard) .000 .000
Probability matching (standard) .362 .500
Win-stay lose-shift (either task) .000 1.000
Optimal diversification (SSFT) .620 .777
TABLE 8.  
Expected Proportion of Shift Choices for Different Response Pat-
terns, Given an Immediately Preceding Win or Loss
Note. Optimal diversification represents the selection of high and low generation 
rate options in a repeating 2:1 ratio. SSFT = simple simulated foraging task.
Task
Standard SSFT
M SE M SE
Stated .071 .013 .357 .030
Learned .207 .028 .270 .026
TABLE 9.  
Observed Proportion of Choice Shifts Following a Win, for Each 
Task and Condition
Task
Standard SSFT
M SE M SE
Stated .199 .028 .595 .032
Learned .422 .028 .587 .027
TABLE 10.  
Observed Proportion of Choice Shifts Following a Loss, for Each 
Task and Condition
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abilities are fixed, taking an intuitive versus strategic approach will lead to 
a systematic divergence in choice behaviour.
Incidentally, levels of apophenia were found to be significantly higher 
on the SSFT than on the standard task as well as in the learned than stated 
probability conditions. This makes sense, as on the SSFT, rewards were 
contingent in some manner upon previous choices, and therefore not 
entirely IID. Nonetheless, as on the standard task, levels of apophenia were 
found to have no substantive effect on choice behaviour.
The findings of another recent publication (Schulze et al., 2017) 
conducted with a similar premise to the current study can provide a 
useful comparative measure. When comparing reward-hold with no 
hold conditions, Schulze et al. found neither a significant main effect of 
reward retention on average choice proportions nor any reliable group-
level interaction effects. Nevertheless, further probing of distributions of 
individual participant level choices suggested that substantial underlying 
differences were, in fact, present between the two reward schedules. In the 
reward-hold condition, the modal peak response was near optimal diver-
sification of choices. By contrast, individual choice proportions demon-
strated a relatively platykurtic distribution within the no hold condition. 
Here, while the modal response was maximizing, a tail of participants 
extended substantially beyond probability matching, with a small subset 
of participants even reaching chance levels of responding. When consider-
ing the final block of the task, potentially effective diversification was 6.94 
times more prevalent in the reward-hold than the no hold condition. By 
contrast, maximizing was 9.63 times more prevalent in the no hold condi-
tion. Therefore, the authors argue that their results provide clear evidence 
for qualitatively different response patterns between the two conditions, 
despite the lack of significant group-level differences. 
The results of the present study are broadly consistent with these find-
ings. However, they also indicated a clear group-level difference between 
choices on the SSFT and the standard task. There were two key differences 
between the reward schedules of these two studies, which merit clear 
reiteration. Together, these might explain much, if not all, of the appar-
ent discrepancy in observed group-level effects. First, in the Schulze et al. 
(2017) study’s reward-hold condition, a single reward could persist over 
time in the unchosen option, but multiple rewards were not permitted to 
accumulate. On the SSFT, the rewards not only remained in an underex-
ploited option but were also allowed to continually accrue until they were 
collected. This entails that while the SSFT and the reward-hold condition 
are analogous in principle, with some degree of diversification becoming 
advantageous on each task, the specific levels of diversification that are 
optimal are not the same. In fact, while probability matching is an optimal 
response-pattern on the SSFT and diversification is necessary to maxim-
ise rewards over the task, it is also possible to do so almost equivalently 
through a relatively broad range of choice diversification patterns. For 
example, 1:1, 2:1, and 3:1 ratios of option selection can each approximate 
optimal outcomes over the task, even though they do not all optimise 
likelihood of reward on each individual trial.
Second, Schulze et al. (2017) controlled for perceived discriminability 
over the two conditions. This entailed substantially closer mean reward 
contingencies in their no hold condition (.76 vs .63-.65), which also fluctu-
ated during the task, as compared with the fixed and substantially more 
easily discriminable contingencies ( .70 vs .30) used in the standard condi-
tion of the present study, against which behaviour on the SSFT was com-
pared. We conducted analyses to assess the extent to which differences 
in experienced outcome discriminability influenced choices on the SSFT. 
These revealed that higher experienced discriminability over the first two-
thirds of the task was associated with more, rather than less, diversification of 
choices over the final third. We consider the most likely explanation for this 
possibly counter-intuitive finding to be that diversification of choices on the 
SSFT directly entails higher outcome discriminability, and between-subjects 
differences in the tendency to diversify may have remained relatively stable 
across the task. Nonetheless, this finding fails to support the hypothesis that 
experienced discriminability is an important driving factor behind diversifica-
tion on the SSFT, although it is still likely to be so on a fixed-probability task. 
Relatedly, we also examined subjective estimates of the ratio of resource 
generation rates between the two options, both on the SSFT and the standard 
task. Here, the results showed that perceived SSFT reward generation rates 
were entirely unrelated to experienced outcome discriminability within both 
conditions. This indicates that participants must have derived their percep-
tions of reward generation in each option from more than the experienced 
outcome discriminability alone. We propose that this reflects a general 
understanding of the principle of reward accumulation in the unchosen 
option, even within the learned probability condition. In addition, al-
though we found no effect of subjective estimates of SSFT resource gen-
eration rates on choices, equivalent analyses for the standard task revealed 
a significant relationship within the learned probability condition. This 
is not surprising, as this is the only task condition in which participants 
rely entirely upon their own experience to discern outcome contingen-
cies, and these contingencies can be reliably determined from experienced 
outcomes alone.
Further analyses were conducted to explore overall proportions of 
WSLS-congruent choices over the two tasks, paired with a more specific 
examination of how often participants tended to switch their response 
immediately following rewarded or unrewarded trials. Here, partici-
pants were found to be substantially more likely to shift following a loss 
than a win, as would be predicted by any reinforcement learning-based 
model. Nevertheless, recorded proportions of win-shift choices were 
clearly nonzero in all task conditions, despite a maximizing strategy on 
the standard task entailing no switching between options at all. However, 
significantly greater proportions of win-shift choices were observed on the 
SSFT than the standard task. This difference was particularly exaggerated 
between the two stated probability conditions, in which respondents were 
five times as likely to switch choices following a win on the SSFT than they 
were on the standard task. This finding demonstrates that respondents on 
the SSFT diversified in a manner that was not driven by WSLS, at least 
not exclusively so. It instead suggests a substantive degree of anticipatory 
switching, which was likely driven by varying degrees of cognizance of 
resource accumulation in the unchosen option. This interpretation is sup-
ported by the finding that on the SSFT win-shift choices were significantly 
more common in the stated probability condition, in which knowledge of 
the process by which resources accumulate was made explicitly available 
from the outset.
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Significant interaction terms were evident between task and condition. 
This was true for overall WSLS-consistent choices and, inversely so, for both 
proportions of win- and lose-shift choices when considered independently. 
The former two of these terms are congruent and likely reflect opposing effects 
of stated reward contingencies between the two tasks. As discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraph, providing respondents with prior knowledge of the SSFT 
reward schedule encouraged the use of win-shift choices, reflecting periodic 
exploration of the more rarely exploited option in anticipation of resources 
having accumulated therein. By contrast, on the standard task stating reward 
probabilities led to a higher incidence of win-stay choices through engen-
dering probability maximizing. The pattern of lose-shift choice proportions 
runs counter to that observed in total WSLS-consistent choices, which serves 
to illustrate that these overall effects were driven primarily by differences in 
choices following rewarded rather than unrewarded trials.
On the whole, the results of present study are consistent with the theory 
that choice diversification, and potentially probability matching, represent an 
overextension of an instinctive response which has historically represented an 
evolutionarily adaptive foraging strategy. However, it would be inappropriate 
to claim that the current findings alone constitute conclusive evidence in sup-
port of this account. There are a range of potential explanations for why choice 
diversification might be an intuitive response on the standard probability 
matching task, which we acknowledge that the findings of the present study 
do not rule out.
First, the presence of competitors provides a valid alternative mecha-
nism for establishing matching as an optimal response. Competition 
for limited resources has likely provided an equally long-standing and 
consistently important selection pressure as the potential for resources to 
accumulate and deplete over time. Several previous studies, in relation to 
both the IFD and its possible application to probability matching, have 
focused on competition rather than resource accumulation as the pri-
mary basis for this (cf. Kraft & Baum, 2001; Kraft et al., 2002; Madden 
et al., 2002; Sokolowski et al., 1999; Schulze et al., 2015; Weber, 1998). 
Behavioural tendencies that were originally established in response to this 
factor could drive instinctive diversification of choices in noncompetitive 
environments. 
Alternatively, rather than probability matching being manifest as an 
inherently instinctive response, the tendency to diversify choices might 
be an overlearned behaviour, developing from common environmental 
principles that are encountered in everyday life and which can establish 
heuristic responses. If, for instance, outcomes are not assumed to be fixed, 
a characteristic that is relatively uncommon in real-life situations, then 
the periodic exploration of alternatives is an important behaviour for 
the purposes of maintaining an accurate and up to date representation 
of the reward value of different options. This is crucial in permitting the 
behavioural flexibility to more optimally track potential shifts in reward 
contingencies over time. A study conducted by Green, Benson, Kersten, 
and Schrater (2010) offers an overt empirical illustration of this point. This 
study revealed that diversification naturally results from model-based 
learning when there is uncertainty regarding the fixedness of reward 
schedules. Here, an optimal Bayesian algorithm converged upon probabil-
ity matching when it was initialized with an incorrect world-model, based 
upon the ecologically plausible assumptions that reward probabilities 
were neither IID. nor coupled to those of their alternatives. In addition, 
the representativeness heuristic offers another example of how probability 
matching could result from the mistaken application of seemingly com-
mon sense logic. Irrespective of whether or not someone is aware that 
reward contingencies are fixed and IID, they are likely to assume that the 
best response pattern will generally approximate salient characteristics of 
the actual outcome sequence.
To summarise, in this study, we developed a simple simulated forag-
ing task. This was done by making superficial modifications to a standard 
2AFC probability matching task, along with modelling the persistence and 
accumulation of unharvested resources within the task reward schedule. 
Analyses contrasted observed behaviour between this and a standard 
fixed-probability task. Discrepancies were identified in both choice behav-
iour and the effects of learning, provision of reward probability informa-
tion, and self-reported strategy use. These combined to indicate that the 
effect of deliberation over intuition in engendering maximizing behaviour 
is particular to the standard fixed probability task. When the potential 
for uncollected resources to accumulate over time was incorporated into 
the reward schedule, we no longer observed any effect of overall levels of 
strategy use on choice behaviour. Rather, a convergence of choice patterns 
was found across participants, with those acting intuitively now behaving 
statistically equivalently to those that take a more deliberative approach. 
Previous research has supported heuristic-based accounts of probability 
matching. These propose that diversification is a readily-available strategy, 
which can be expressed in situations where it will not result in maximum 
pay-offs whenever insufficient deliberation is applied. Although they do 
not rule out alternative explanations, the current findings are compatible 
with the further hypothesis that the ready-availability of the matching 
response might have become established due to having represented a his-
torically adaptive foraging strategy. Probability matching might therefore 
represent an instinctive overextension of an otherwise normative foraging 
behaviour. However, further research is required in order to more conclu-
sively determine the validity of this theory. 
FOOTNOTES
1 Degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction for violations of sphericity.
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APPENDIX A
TASK INSTRUCTIONS. SLIDE 1.
Welcome to the experiment. You will be presented with a series of 
choices. On each trial, a yellow and a blue signposted patch of land will 
be shown to either side of the screen. Your task is to choose to forage 
in one or the other on each trial. For each successful forage, 2p will be 
added to your total winnings. You can choose between these two forag-
ing areas by pressing the q key for whichever option is shown to the left 
of the screen, or the p key for whichever option is shown to the right of 
the screen. Remember, it is the colour of the signpost in each area that 
is important. The side to which each colour patch is presented will vary 
randomly between trials and does not have any effect on likelihood of 
reward. The aim is to win as much money as possible throughout the 
task, by foraging successfully on as many trials as possible. Once you 
have read and understood the task instructions, press the space bar to 
continue. If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter..
APPENDIX B
TASK INSTRUCTIONS. ADDITIONAL REWARD GENERA-
TION RATE INFORMATION (ONLY SHOWN IN STATED 
PROBABILITIES GROUP).
The two foraging areas will accumulate resources at different rates. On 
each trial, the probability of a new resource appearing in the blue sign-
posted patch will be 0.49, while the probability of a new resource ap-
pearing in the yellow patch will be 0.21. This means that a new reward 
can be expected to become available in the blue patch, on average, in 
49% of trials, and for the yellow patch, on average, in 21% of trials. Any 
resources that appear in the patch that you do not select will remain 
available, and accumulate over time, until they are taken. This means 
that one patch of land may contain more than one available reward. 
However, only a single reward may be taken on any one trial. Once 
you have read and understood this information, press the space bar to 
continue. If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter.
APPENDIX C
WORDING OF QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS (WITH THE BLUE 
PATCH AS THE HIGH GENERATION RATE OPTION).
On every trial each patch of land had a certain probability of gaining 
an extra resource. Please estimate on what proportion of trials (%) you 
think that a new reward appeared in the blue and yellow signposted 
patches (over the entire task).
Blue Patch:                     %
Yellow Patch:                     %
Overall, to what extent do you feel that you used your intuition to 
make your choices on the task, as opposed to any explicitly held plan 
or strategy?
(1 = pure intuition, 5 = pure strategy)
1 2 3 4 5
Please answer whether you agree or disagree with the following state-
ments (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = slightly disagree, 3 = unsure, 4 = 
slightly agree, 5 = strongly agree)
There was a pattern in the reward sequence.
1 2 3 4 5
